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2From Growth to Stagnation
In the 20th century, the poorer economies on the European periphery
experienced rapid economic growth and fast convergence of per capita income levels
vis-à-vis the most advanced economies in the world. In Europe, and for the first time
since the onset of industrialization, the gaps between average country incomes as well
as a subsequent decline in cross-country income inequalities were considerably
reduced. (Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002). The Portuguese economy was one of
the great success stories in the process of economic convergence. Since the Fifties, it
had made a remarkable transformation. In a relatively short period, Portugal moved
from a low-growth, low-openness and an agrarian-based economy to a largely high-
growth, high openness and industrial economy. From the late Fifties until the mid
Seventies, the country not only industrialized and achieved some of the highest rates
of economic growth in Western Europe. (Crafts and Toniolo, 1998) It also, and
perhaps not coincidently, managed to open itself to the rest of Europe, by entering the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1960 and by substantially expanding its export
base. After 1973, the rate of economic growth fell. Still, the Portuguese economy was
able to absorb relatively well a sharp shift in economic and fiscal policy after the
implementation of democracy in 1974, the loss of colonial markets that gave rise to a
sudden diversion of trade, the nationalization of major companies during the
revolutionary period of 1974 and 1975, as well as two significant financial crises in
the late Seventies and early Eighties.
Economic growth picked up after macroeconomic stabilization was achieved in
the mid Eighties and following the country’s joining the European Economic
Community in 1986, which further increased the country’s openness. Economic
liberalization and a privatization program also contributed to rapid growth. By the
early Nineties, Portugal was being sollicited for its economic success (European
Commission 1992), for its economic miracle (Mateus, 1998; Neves 1994), and for its
speed of convergence. (Barros and Garoupa, 1995). Since the late Nineties, however,
the Portuguese economy began to display several structural problems, especially with
regards to productivity, as well as substantial fiscal and external imbalances. In the
decade following, and even though Portugal joined the European monetary union, the
Portuguese economy stagnated. Unemployment rose to historical levels. There was a
significant resumption of emigration. (Pereira, 2010a; 2010b)
Given its trajectory within Europe, Portugal provides an interesting example of
how countries on the European periphery adapted to broader changes in the European
economy, and how poorer countries sought to close the structural gaps in human and
physical capital with the most advanced economies. The recent Portuguese experience
also provides valuable lessons on how countries adapted to the €uro since the late
Nineties.
Accordingly, this Chapter sets out the main features of the Portuguese economy
since 1950. It tries to understand the reasons behind the extraordinary turn events took
over the past few decades. This it does by surveying the main causes behind the
recent stagnation in the economy. One of the main reasons behind the second
slowdown in the Portuguese economy was the steady but inexorable decline in the
3trend in productivity growth since at least the end of the Nineties. Based on an
historical account for the sources of economic growth, human capital, arguably will
also have an instrumental role in the resumption of productivity, and consequently, of
economic growth in Portugal.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the main trends in
the Portuguese economy since 1950, focusing particularly on the period after the fall
of the Dictatorship. Section Three examines the main factors behind Portugal’s
disappointing economic performance since the late Nineties, whilst section Four
analyzes the contribution of human capital to economic growth and assesses
Portugal’s transition from an agrarian society to, possibly, a knowledge-based
economy. The conclusion is set out in section Five.
The Portuguese Economy since 1950
Portugal entered the 20th century as one of the poorest countries in the Western
world and with one of the highest emigration rates. (Lains 2003a; Baganha, 1994) In
contrast to other Western European countries, Portugal then was predominantly an
agrarian society, with most of the population still living in rural areas. Portugal also
displayed one of the lowest levels of human capital in the West, both in terms of
literacy and enrolment rates, and thus a marked educational gap vis-à-vis other
European countries. (Amaral, 2002; Reis, 2004) Over the decades that followed, the
country’s economic backwardness persisted and the living standards of the average
Portuguese remained low. During the first part of the 20th century, the structure of the
Portuguese economy changed little. By 1950, more than half those employed still
worked in the agricultural sector. The big breakthrough for the Portuguese economy
occurred when industrialization gathered speed, when hundreds of thousands of
people left their occupations in the countryside and flocked to the cities in search of
urban and industrial jobs, or emigrated. 1
In order grasp the development Portugal’s economy over the long term, Figure
1 shows the evolution of Portuguese GDP and GDP per capita since 1900.2
Portugal’s GDP increased throughout most of the 20th century, accelerated
significantly in the postwar period, especially after the mid Fiftiess, at which point
and at long last the country finally began to industrialize. From 1960 until 1973, the
Portuguese economy reached some of the highest rates of growth in the world, and, as
will be shown, set it on a path of rapid convergence of Portugal’s level of income per
capita in relation to that of the wealthiest European countries. (Maddison, 2003)
1 The Sixties were also a period of high emigration. (Baganha, 1994).
2 Economic growth is smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which removes short-run
fluctuations and extracts the long-term trend in growth.
4Fig. 1.
Trend growth in GDP and GDP capita, 1900-2008.
Source: Calculated from Maddison (2003), Total Economy Database, Conference board
The trend in economic growth peaked in the early Seventies, declining
subsequently in the decades following. Economic growth slowed down after 1974,
due in part to lower foreign demand caused by the first ‘oil shock’ and subsequent
recession, but also to the political and economic instability that followed the return to
democracy in 1974. In spite of this down-turn, the trend in economic growth remained
by historical standards, high.
In 1986, the economic growth trend accelerated after Portugal’s accession to the
European Economic Community which saw a wave of institutional reform, an
ambitious agenda of economic liberalization and the privatization of several of
Portugal’s major companies. However, acceleration in economic growth was short-
lived. By the end of the Nineties, the trend started to fall off - gradually but
inexorably. Economic stagnation ensued. 3
Effective convergence with the European core countries followed a similar path
to that of economic growth. This is set out in Figure 2, which represents the distance
between the Portuguese economy and the European core from 1900 until 2009. The
dotted line shows the level of Portuguese GDP per capita in 1974, when democracy
was restored. Table 1 compares the growth of real income per capita in Portugal and
other countries in the European periphery with the European core from 1913. During
the first half of the 20th century, Portugal’s real income per capita relative to that in
the European core remained to all intents and purposes constant. In other words, the
Portuguese economy converged towards Europe’s most advanced countries only
slightly.
3 These broad tendencies of Portuguese economy are also corroborated by a recent study (Jalles and
Pereira 2010), which the trend in the growth of the Portuguese economy was estimated by using a
Basic Structural model and a corresponding Kalman filter.
5During the interwar years, income per capita in Portugal and in the European
core grew at similar rates, with the relative gap between them remaining fairly stable.
Despite substantial political instability and macroeconomic volatility in the years after
World War I, the Portuguese economy still expanded at a rate higher than the early
years of the 20th century. (Lains 2007, Neves 1994) Expansion occurred in the teeth of
problems associated with the country’s balance of payments, brought about by a
substantial fall in the money sent back from Brazil by emigrants, as well as by a sharp
fall in revenue from colonial re-exports. Thus, at the onset of the Great Depression,
the Portuguese economy managed to grow while most of the other national economies
did not, which gave rise to a short period of convergence with the European core.
However, shortly after, under Salazar’s stabilization plan of the Thirties the economy
stagnated and, with the winds of recession blowing from Europe, convergence
regressed.
Figure 2.
Portugal’s convergence to the European Core (= 100),
GDP per capita, 1900-2009
Source: Calculated from Maddison (2003), Total Economy Database, Conference board
During the Second World War, the Portuguese economy picked up once again,
growing faster than the European core. Neutrality not only allowed Portugal to avoid
the destruction of human and physical capital. It also saw a substantial increase in
exports of wolfram, - a key strategic material - textiles and wine to the belligerents.
(Mateus, 1998) Exports surged with the increase in foreign demand, and an
improvement in Portugal’s terms of trade. During the war years, the economy
converged rapidly towards the European core, not least because the latter were badly
affected by the war itself. However, once again, convergence was brief. The escudo
rose in value and the terms of trade, less favourable, caused a sharp fall in both
exports and economic growth at the end of the Forties. Happily, from the decade
following, convergence with the European core resumed and did so strongly. During
what some now see as a ‘European Golden Age’, that lasted from 1950 to 1973,
Western Europe’s most advanced countries grew at historically high rates, driven on
by rapid growth in productivity, capital accumulation and technological progress.
(Crafts and van Ark, 1997; Maddison, 2003)
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Growth of Real Income per capita on the European Periphery.
1913-2009
Portugal Spain Greece Ireland European
core
1913-1929 1.35 1.65 2.45 0.33 1.39
1929-1938 1.28 -3.53 1.50 0.87 1.16
1938-1950 1.56 1.48 -2.72 0.94 1.00
1950-1973 5.47 5.63 5.99 2.98 3.55
1973-1986 1.52 1.31 1.75 2.47 2.01
1986-1998 3.45 2.65 1.39 5.42 1.88
1998-2009 1.00 2.8 3.3 3.5 1.31
1913-1998 2.79 2.20 2.29 2.19 2.06
Source: Lains (2003), The Conference Board database
During these years, despite rapid growth at the European core, the Portuguese
economy showed unprecedented rates of convergence in income per capita, closing
the gap vis-à-vis European core countries at an average of 1.85 percent per annum
(Table 2). On the European periphery, Portugal grew at a rate similar to, albeit
slightly lower than, Greece and Spain.
In the aftermath of the 1974 Revolution, Portugal’s relative performance was
not so impressive. With the nationalization of major industries during the
revolutionary period, with the financial and political instability that ensued, economic
growth fell in the latter half of the Seventies. As a result, between 1973 and 1986, real
convergence regressed. Portuguese real income per capita moved apart from the
European core at a rate that oscillated around 0.5% per annum. Convergence returned
with the mid Eighties. The country joined the European Economic Community and a
sweeping program of economic liberalization was injected. Between 1986 and 1998,
Portugal’s economy moved towards the European core by some 3.45 per cent per
year, markedly higher than the rate of convergence of Spain - average rate 0.76
percent per annum, though less than the sparkling performance of the Irish economy,
which clipped along a spanking annual rate of 3.48 percent.
Table 2.
Convergence of real incomes per capita in the European periphery.
1913-1998.
Portugal Spain Greece Ireland
1913-1929 -0.04 0.26 1.04 -1.04
1929-1938 0.12 -4.64 0.33 -0.29
1938-1950 0.55 0.47 -3.69 -0.06
1950-1973 1.85 2.01 2.36 -0.55
1973-1986 -0.49 -0.69 -0.26 0.45
1986-1998 1.54 0.76 -0.48 3.48
1913-1998 0.72 0.14 0.23 0.13
Notes: Convergence is defined according to:
= [y i/y9)(t+1)/(yi/y9)(t)][1/(t+1-t)
Where yi denotes income per capita for country i, and y9 is an income index for the nine
European core countries
7Source: 1913-1990: Lains (2007), 1998-2009: calculated from Conference Board
dataset.
If the whole period from 1913 to 1998 is taken into account, the Portuguese
economy grew faster than its European counterparts, including the other economies
on the European periphery, which brought about a swift convergence in both incomes
and living standards. More specifically, and as Table 3 shows, between 1913 and
1998, the rate of convergence of the Portuguese economy with the European core –
0.72 percent per year – was significantly higher than Spain at 0.14%, Greece at
0.23%, and Ireland with 0.13%. Even so, since the late Nineties, the tide of
convergence is again on the ebb. Not only that, but the ebbing away of convergence
with the core economies has been the longest and most sustained since the end of the
Second World War. From the last decade of the 20th century, the Portuguese
economy, when compared to other economies in Europe and other countries on the
periphery – Ireland and Spain, for example - has clearly been underperforming.
Nevertheless, in the course of the last century, Portugal mutated from being an
agrarian economy to become a middle-income, industrialized country. The country
became an exporter of traditional products, such as textiles, shoes and clothing, as
well as certain intermediate products, namely electronic components and industrial
molds. Although the drivers of industrialization may be traced back to the late Fifties,
economic convergence with the European core and relatively fast economic growth
carried on during the first decades of a democratic Portugal – a trend especially
noticeable between 1986 and 1998, the years of European integration and the
introduction of liberalization, economic and institutional. Yet, the past decade has
seen the economy stagnate and unemployment soar. The factors that lay beneath the
recently under-performing Portuguese economy are now analyzed.
Explaining the decline in economic growth: the Nineties and their Aftermath.
Several possible explanations are to hand to account for the literal reversal of
Portugal’s fortunes. First and probably foremost, the past decade saw a substantial
slowdown in productivity, which contributed to the fall in economic growth.
Although the drop in the growth rate of productivity has not yet been fully analyzed at
an empirical level, the most likely villains include structural change (Lains 2008),
relatively low rates of accumulating human capital, (Pina and St. Aubyn 2005), plus
an increase in unemployment. (Jalles and Pereira 2010) Second, economic growth
was also hindered by a difficult adjustment to the euro, which slowed down job
creation and lowered export competitiveness. (Blanchard 2006, Eichengreen 2007).
Third, although the rapid and unprecedented rise in investment rates over the last few
decades has contributed to rapid economic growth, increasing evidence suggests that
capital accumulation may have reached a threshold of diminishing returns. Fourth,
economic policy aggravated the situation by exacerbating the internal imbalances and
the structural weaknesses of the Portuguese economy, namely in the realm of public
finances, as well as the fact that the economy is still too dependent on low skilled
labour force. These explanations will now be pursued in greater detail.
8The drop in productivity
One of the most striking developments in the Portuguese economy has been a
significant decline in productivity. This has worsened over the last few years. This
trend stands out in Figure 3, which plots growth in labour productivity, measured as
total output per hour, between 1957 and 2009.4 As expected, growth in labour
productivity followed a path similar to economic growth, increasing during the early
industrialization phase, falling in the Seventies and early Eighties. However, contrary
to growth of GDP per capita, trend in the growth of labour productivity did not rise in
the late Eighties.
Figure 3.
Productivity GDP per hour growth,
1957-2009 (HP filter)
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Calculated from Maddison (2003), Conference Board (2009)
Still, it is worth noting, during this period, that the drop in the trend of
productivity growth, which had taken place since the 1970s, was halted temporarily.
In fact, the mid Nineties saw a small rise in the trend of labour productivity although,
soon after – in 1998 - it resumed its downward course. By 2005, the trend in GDP per
hour grew at a rate close to zero percent per annum, a performance that did not alter
in the years following.
This steady decline in productivity is also clearly visible when Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) growth, which measures changes in the productivity of both
labour and capital, is examined. Figure 4, shows TFP growth was relatively high
during the period of industrialization in the Sixties, dropped during the period of
political upheaval that followed the 1974 revolution, but picked up again – though
briefly - later in the same decade.
4 As before, the data are smoothed by the Hodrick-Prescott filter
9Figure 4.
Total factor productivity growth, 1960-2009
Source: Lains (2003) and AMECO
In the Eighties, TFP growth fell during the years of financial uncertainty and the
subsequent austerity measures that followed, but rose again with the country’s
adhesion to the EEC and with the move towards policies of privatization and
economic liberalization that marked the end of the decade. However, once again, the
gains were ephemeral, and the Nineties unfolded against the backdrop of a steady
decline in growth of TFP, which fell even further during the first years of the new
millennium to become negative with the recessions at its outset and in 2008-2009.
The importance of TFP growth for the performance of the Portuguese economy
since 1973 is underlined further by Table 3. It sets out the sources of Portuguese
economic growth over the hundred years from 1910 to 2009.5 Thus, in the interwar
years, capital accumulation accounted for almost two-thirds of the economic growth,
while human capital and labour made more modest contributions - around 20%. TFP
was, for all intents and purposes residual, with an average growth of -0.2% per
annum.
5 Data on labour were obtained from National Institute of Statistics labour force statistics, data on
capital accumulation from Lains (2003a) and Freitas (2005), whilst human capital growth is measured
as the average years of schooling of the active population.
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Table 3.
Sources of Portuguese economic growth, 1910-2009.
Annual growth rates As percent of output growth
Labour Human
capital
Capital TFP GDP Labour Human
capital
Capital TFP
1910-
1934
0.33 0.70 0.42 0.72 2.17 15.4 32.1 19.2 33.3
1934-
1947
0.44 0.38 1.30 -0.02 2.09 20.8 18.2 62.0 -0.10
1947-
1973
0.23 0.82 2.58 1.53 5.17 4.5 15.9 49.9 29.7
1973-
1990
0.02 1.61 1.74 0.56 3.93 0.5 41.0 44.3 14.2
1990-
2000
0.73 1.27 0.8 1.5 3.17 20.9 36.3 42.8
2000-
2009
-0.03 0.80 -2.46 -0.1 0.89
1990-
2009
0.38 1.09 1.41 0.7 2.14
Source: Lains (2003), Barro and Lee (2010), AMECO, Freitas (2005)
In the after war years and on until 1973, capital accumulation continued to be
the most important source of growth for the Portuguese economy, causing it to
expand at an average rate of 2.58 percent per year, sufficient to account for almost
half of all growth. Human capital also expanded more rapidly after 1947, to the tune
of 0.82 percent per annum, whereas labour, undermined by high emigration rates, rose
by only 0.23 percent per year. In turn, and as Figure 4 already made clear, TFP
accelerated substantially, as did its contribution to economic growth which accounted
for around one third of total growth. After 1973, growth decreased. It became less
capital intensive. By contrast, urged on by the unprecedented investment in education
undertaken by democratic governments, the contribution of human capital as a
proportion of total economic growth reached around 41%.
All in all, the main source Portuguese economic growth in the 20th century was
capital accumulation. The contribution of labour to economic growth over those
years, was small – not greatly surprising given the high emigration rates that persisted
across the century. Yet, human capital was a crucial source of growth during these ten
decades. Though this will be developed in greater detail later, despite the fact that
indicators of Portugal’s educational dynamic showed it to be weak by European
standards, nevertheless they rose significantly throughout the century, with a positive
impact on economic growth. With a certain similarity to the development processes of
the Asian Tigers – South Korea, Taiwan, Singapour and Japan. (Young, 1991), the
growth in TFP was less substantial in Portugal than it was in other Western
economies. Nevertheless, as the Table above shows, the decrease in economic growth
since 1973 can be attributed in greater part to the fall in TFP growth. In other words,
the Portuguese economy was employing more people and using more capital but
using them in a less efficient way, in contrast to what happened before 1973.
Other studies bear these findings out. Afonso (1999), for example, provides
additional evidence of the contribution total factor productivity makes to Portugal’s
economic performance. He pointed out the rapid rise in economic growth in the years
1960-73 can be attributed to total factor productivity and the growth in capital stock,
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which account to 93.4 percent of growth in GDP. Lains (2003a) used the variables on
Levine and Renelt (1992), and showed that whilst their model replicates Portuguese
growth performance from 1910 until 1973 relatively well, it does not account for the
post-1973 growth slowdown. After all, Portugal’s investment and school enrolment
ratios remained high over the ensuing period. Lains claimed that the decline in TFP
growth is crucial in any explanation for the drop in growth after 1973. Mateus (2005)
reached similar conclusions about the main sources of Portuguese economic growth.
He estimated that capital accumulation contributed between 31% and 46% to
economic growth the 90 years from 1910-2000, but was particularly significant
during the years of the Golden Age from 1950-73. Mateus’s findings also confirmed
the increasing importance of human capital as a driver of growth, accounting for 31%
of total growth over the two and a half decades from 1975-2000. According to these
figures, investment in education was of paramount relevance for the growth of the
Portuguese economy in that period.
What explains the decline of TFP growth in the 1990s and in the following
decade? One possible explanation for the disappointing level of productivity may lie
the substantial structural change that took place over the past few decades (Table 4).
Rapid industrialization after the 1960s, triggered off an unprecedented increase in
industrial employment. The services sector grew as well. The transfer of labour and
other resources from a low-productivity sector such as agriculture over to a high-
productivity industrial sector was an important generator of productivity and
economic growth in the Sixties and early Seventies. (Lains, 2003a) Precisely the
reverse mechanism has operated in recent decades. As the agricultural labour force
declined, labour productivity increased from 3.5 percent per year from 1950 to 1973
to 4 percent from 1973 to 1990. In parallel, industrial labour productivity fell from 5.8
percent between 1950 and 1973 to only 0.7 percent between 1973 and 1990. Labour
productivity fell dramatically in the services sector, from 4 percent a year between
1950 and 1973 to -0.1 percent over the period 1973-90. During the decades that
followed, the services sector continued to attract an increasingly large share of total
employment, though productivity growth remained low. In effect, the transition of the
Portuguese economy from an industrial to a more service-based economy brought
about both a lower rate of productivity growth, and a drop in economic growth.
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Table 4.
Output and Productivity Growth by Economic Sector, 1950-1990.
1950-1973 1973-1990 1990-1999 2000-2009
AGRICULTURE
Output 1.3 1.2 1.5 -0.4
Employment -2.2 -2.8 -3.7 -0.6
Productivity 3.5 4.0 5.2 0.2
INDUSTRY
Output 7.6 2.5 -3.3 -0.2
Employment 1.8 1.8 -8.0 -2.0
Productivity 5.8 0.7 4.7 2.2
SERVICES
Output 6.0 3.7 3.9 1.8
Employment 1.6 3.8 2.9 1.3
Productivity 4.4 -0.1 1.0 0.5
TOTAL GDP
Output 5.7 2.9 3.4 0.9
Employment 0.2 1.7 0.8 0.2
Productivity 5.5 1.2 2.6 0.7
Source: Lains (2003a), AMECO
These trends stand forth in Figure 5. It shows the growth of value added since
1985 by sector. Over the past quarter century, of all sectors the agricultural sector
underwent the greatest volatility in terms of growth in value added, which grew
rapidly in the years following the country’s entry to the EEC. Thereafter, it fell
drastically, even showing rates of negative growth early in the new millennium. Value
added in agriculture recovered in some measure after 2005, but its average rate hovers
around 1% per year. Another sector with a disappointing performance in terms of
value added is construction and building, with negative growth rates since the early
Nineties. Its level of value added fell significantly over the past twenty years.
Figure 5.
Growth in value added by sector (5-year averages), 1985-2009.
Source: Calculated from AMECO
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Growth in the value added by industry also declined since 1990, though at a rate
somewhat slower than in other sectors. Thus, from 1990 until 2000, industrial value
added grew at a healthy average of 4.9% per annum, and fell back to an average of
2,6% between 2000 and 2009. If growth in value added of the services sector was
steadier, it was also much smaller. From the early Nineties, value added by services
never grew faster than an average of 1% per year, dropping back to 0,5% between
2001 and 2009.
Structural change apart, what other factors explain the decrease in TFP growth?
Several studies have shown that TFP growth is also strongly correlated labour
productivity. Thus, its drop is likely to be related with a decline in labour efficiency.
This is, indeed, so as Figure 6 illustrates. It shows strong correlation between TFP
growth (on the horizontal axis) and labour productivity (on the vertical axis) over the
years 1960 and 2009.
Figure 6.
TFP Growth and Labour Productivity Growth, 1960-2009
Mateus (2005) argued that the behavior of TFP growth in Portugal is probably
related to the degree of openness of the economy, to macroeconomic stability, as well
as to institutional factors. Jalles and Pereira (2010) found that it had been influenced
by unemployment rates and by the level of human capital. More empirical research is
certainly needed, and we are certain that the decline in productivity will be actively
researched in the near future.
Adjusting with difficulty to the Euro.
Several scholars (Blanchard, 2006; Eichengreen, 2007; Johnson, 2010) pointed
out that a difficult adjustment to the euro was one of the main reasons behind
Portugal’s profile of low-growth and high-unemployment over the past decade. They
claimed that wages and unit labour costs increased faster in Portugal than they did for
traditional competitors of Portuguese exports in international markets. Thus, the
Portuguese economy lost competitiveness and stagnated. Bento (2009) argued that
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unit labour costs rose more in Portugal than in Germany, due to low wage restraint,
and a rapid rise in wages in the non-tradable sector, such as the construction and the
electric power industries. Rising unit labour costs are clear in Figure 7, which shows
the evolution of nominal unit labour costs in selected European economies, in
Germany and in the Euro Zone.
Figure 7.
Nominal unit labour costs in selected European countries,
1995-2009 (2000 =100)
Source: AMECO
Portuguese unit labour costs rose faster than the Euro zone, in countries such as
Germany, which in the decade past stood by a policy of wage restraint. Rises in unit
labour costs similar to those of Portugal were seen in other Southern European
countries, which had the effect of cutting back their competitiveness and accumulated
considerable deficits in their current account. Thus, it is tempting to conclude that loss
of competitiveness and low economic growth were, in large part, caused by rises in
unit labour costs. However, once the evolution of nominal unit labour costs in
Portugal and some Eastern European countries, traditionally regarded as competitors
of Portuguese exports is examined Portugal’s loss of competitiveness is less clear.
Figure 8,which plots unit labour costs for Portugal and several Eastern European
countries, shows that practically all large Eastern European countries saw unit labour
costs rise and far more than Portugal. Poland is the exception in managing to place a
fairly effective control over the growth in unit labour costs during the past decade.
15
Figure 8.
Nominal unit labour costs in Portugal and Eastern Europe, 1995-2009.
Source: AMECO
Indeed, evolution in real unit labour costs was even more modest.6 (see table
A1 in the Appendix). Between 2000 and 2009, real unit labour costs in Portugal
increased by a mere 1,3 percentage points, nothing that would undermine export
competitiveness, much less explain the extent of the recent economic slowdown.
More revealing still, the main increase in real unit labour costs took place between
2008 and 2009, rising by 3,2 percentage points, and not from the start of the decade,
when the Portuguese economy felt the onset of slow growth and low job creation.
Though a relative loss of competitiveness certainly seems to have occurred, in all
likelihood it was not sufficiently marked to account fully for the depth in the
slowdown over the past ten years.
Yet, other studies highlighted the loss of competitiveness. Alexandre et al.
(2009) showed that the Portuguese exchange rate in the Nineties and the first decade
of the millennium appreciated in real terms by some 7%, which brought about a drop
in the competitiveness of some of the country’s main exports. Such a loss of
competitiveness occurred mainly in export sectors with lower value added and
productivity growth. Cabral (2004) and Amador and Cabral (2008) confirmed that
Portuguese exports suffered significant losses in the international market between
1997 and 2006. More specifically, the main losses in market share hit some of
Portugal’s traditional exports - textiles, clothing and footwear. Between 2002 and
2006, loss of market share extended to the export of motor vehicles, wood and paper.
This loss of market shares, the writers argued, can be explained in part by the rising
costs of Portuguese exports, and also by the appearance on the main international
markets of new competitors – China and Eastern Europe – as contenders with
Portugal’s traditional exports.
6 Nominal cost includes inflation. Real costs do not include inflation, they are in short deflated.
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In a nutshell, difficulty in adjusting to the single European currency was in part
to blame for Portugal’s economic woes, not only an appreciating real exchange rate,
but also loss of competitiveness brought on by a rise in unit labour costs at a rate
faster than many countries in the Euro area. Yet, evidence of the importance of unit
labour costs remains, in our view, inconclusive. Part of the recent loss of international
market share may well be attributed to the arrival of important competitors on the
long-established markets for Portuguese exports. To our best belief, no study on the
loss of competitiveness has yet been able to distinguish between these two factors.
Nor does the loss in competitiveness on its own seem able to account for the marked
slowdown of the last decade.
Decreasing Returns to the Accumulation of Capital?
Since capital deepening, or the increase in the amount of capital available per
worker, has been an essential explanatory variable in the performance of the
Portuguese economy over the past half century - more important than for most OECD
economies - growth in, and the effectiveness of, capital accumulation might explain
the recent slow down in growth. Several studies have stressed its importance to the
growth of the Portuguese economy. Pereira and Andraz (2002, 2004) suggested that,
from the 1960s onwards, public works and public infrastructures had a positive
impact in the economy not only because of their positive rates of return, but also
because they had a positive effect on private investment (the so-called “crowding in”
effect). . Moreover, it provided positive externalities on private investment. They also
found that capital accumulation in infrastructures had significant dynamic effects on
the economy. Pina and St. Aubyn (2005) noted that between 1960 and 2005, public
investment yielded greater profitability in terms of economic growth than either
private or human capital investment. Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009) reached similar
conclusions, while Freitas (2005) confirmed that capital accumulation was crucial to
Portugal’s economic growth.
Nevertheless, researchers are not at one in praising the importance of public
investment for the performance of the Portuguese economy. Afonso and Sousa (2009)
using quarterly data from 1977 until 2008, found contradictory evidence about the
role of public investment and public expenditure. They showed it had a negative
impact on private investment and consumption. Afonso (2005) came to a similar
conclusion.
Evidence on the role of capital accumulation, is not, a first sight, clear cut. It
may hold true only for the recent past, but not for earlier decades. Data on the
marginal efficiency of capital seem to support the notion that the law of diminishing
returns in some form, applies to the accumulation of capital and might operate in
Portugal. As Figure 9 reveals, the marginal efficiency of capital has been steadily
declining over the years and, in the last decade or so, has been very near to zero.
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Figure 9.
Marginal efficiency of capital, 1960-2009.
Source: AMECO and authors’ calculations
That returns on the accumulation of capital may have fallen in recent decades
has been suggested in other studies. Freitas (2005) presented new time series data on
the evolution in capital stock. They showed that the average productivity of capital
decreased substantially since the Sixties. Furthermore, Jalles and Pereira (2010)
reported that while the marginal efficiency of capital certainly contributed to
economic growth since the Sixties, there was evident a-plenty to support the
hypothesis of decreasing returns to capital accumulation in more recent times.
Still, this interpretation does not command consensus. Pereira and Andraz
(2004) took the view that substantial dynamic and long-run effects on investment,
especially of the public variety, were still present. Despite evidence that purports to
support the thesis of declining returns to capital accumulation, Freitas (2005) argued
that capital accumulation in Portugal had not been “excessive”, since, by the year
2000, the economy still showed a capital:labour ratio that was only 0,64 of its
American version, and as such far less than the difference seen in other European
economies – for instance, Ireland at 0.94, Spain at 0.91 and even Greece with 1.2.
All in all, while research literature seems to support the view that since the
1950s, capital accumulation had an important role in economic growth for Portugal,
whether capital accumulation has reached the point of diminishing returns – or not –
remains unresolved. Studies showed that diminishing returns to capital accumulation
might have had some effect on the slowdown of the past decade, but the data are not
wholly conclusive. Further clarification will need more empirical evidence.
Turning to the quest ion of human capita l, research demonstrated that it
became increasingly important as a source of economic growth in Portugal. As
far as we are aware, no study has yet suggested that decreasing returns to the
accumulation of human capita l in Portugal might be signif icant. In fact, as
Section Four will show, Portugal, compared to other OECD countr ies, still lags
considerably on most indica tors relating to human capita l. Yet, as Table 3
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indica ted, human capita l seems to be replac ing physical capita l as the principal
source of growth in the economy.
From an Agrarian Society to a Knowledge Economy?
Several factors lie behind the pronounced slowdown in the Portuguese economy
since 1974, and apply, more specifically, to the economic stagnation of the past
decade. Sagging productivity, a difficult adjustment to the euro, lower returns to the
accumulation of capital, all seem to have had their part in the stagnation that has set in
since 2000. Over the past few years, economic policy may well have exacerbated the
structural problems in the Portuguese economy by being overly procyclical (Afonso,
2008), too expansionary, (Lopes 2005, 2009), and by being unable to tackle the main
brakes on the economic slowdown. (Pereira, 2009; 2010b) In truth, economic policy
has been singularly ineffective in combating the fall in productivity, for, as we have
seen, the latter seems to have been the major factor in the steady fall-off in economic
growth since the mid 1990s at the very latest.
Human capital has gradually increased its importance for output growth in
Portugal. Capital deepening and total factor productivity were crucial during the
phase of industrialization. Since 1974, however, human capital has become an
important source of growth. There still remains a substantial gap between Portugal
and most of its European partners in terms of the quality and quantity of human
capital. The option for Portugal to invest more in the knowledge-based and
knowledge-intensive sector as a means of boosting its productivity is well worth
pursuing further. This issue will be examined in following Section.
The disappointing performance of Portugal’s economy over the past decade
suggests that a return to productivity growth is a necessary prior condition for
achieving higher rates of economic growth and thus, a rise in the standards of living.
Since a strong link exists between productivity and both quality and quantity of
human capital, investing in a knowledge-based economy might be an appropriate
strategy to bring Portugal’s stagnation to an end and improve the country’s rate of
economic growth. Here, attention focuses on the question whether the Nation’s
economy is moving from a post-agrarian society onward and toward a knowledge
economy. This is a crucial matter. Potentially, important productivity gains are to be
had to be from a knowledge-based economy, as other economies in OECD countries
seem to show. As was argued earlier, between the 1950s and the end of the 20th
century, Portugal evolved successfully from an agrarian economy to an economy
dominated by the industrial and the services sector, a transition that was one of the
principal reasons for rapid productivity growth during the period. Can Portugal
replicate this experience in its drive towards a knowledge economy? Can a knowledge
economy help raise the country’s export competitiveness? These questions are
addressed in this section by looking at the technological content of Portuguese exports
and by analyzing the main human capital indicators in a cross-country perspective.
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The Technological Content of Exports
In the 20th century, the make up and content of Portuguese exports changed
considerably, as structural changes in the economy moved ahead. Early in the 20th
century, Portuguese exports were chiefly primary products and re-exports of colonial
products. Changing from an agrarian society to an industrial and service-based
economy involved significant change in the composition of exports. As Figure 10
shows, industrialization and the opening up of the economy following Portugal’s
entry to EFTA spurred on an extraordinary rise in the exports of textiles, clothing and
shoes, as well as investment goods, such as machines. The specialization of exports
progressed even further in the years immediately before and following Portugal’s
joining the European Economic Community, at the same time the relative importance
of goods with lower technological content, as well as primary products in total
exports fell.
Figure 10.
Main exports by type of product as % of total exports, 1947-1995.
Source: Bank of Portugal
Increased specialization was stimulated further by a significant rise in the
market share these products won on international markets. Amador and Cabral (2008)
estimated that between 1977 and 1986, the market share of Portuguese exports
increased by 5.6 percent, by a further 3.8 percent between 1987 and 1991, with an
additional 2.5 percent for the years 1992-95. From the mid Nineties onward, textiles,
clothing and shoes saw their relative importance in the country’s total exports, fall. In
part, this roll back stemmed from the loss in market share of Portuguese exports,
reckoned between 1997 and 2006 to be about 2.4%. (Amador and Cabral, 2008)
If the composition of Portuguese exports is examined over the past two decades,
some interesting changes occurred in their technological content. From the mid
Nineties, they became less “traditional”. They were no longer goods with low value
added, that drew on the intense use of unskilled labour. Rather, they began
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incorporating more medium and medium-high technologies (such as rubber and
plastic products, machinery and electrical equipment, motor vehicles, and chemical
products) particularly in the case of industrial exports, as can be seen in Table 5,
which sets out the sector’s share of all industrial exports. The technological element
in exports rose. Exports based on high- and medium-high technology currently
account for about 40% of all manufactured products. (Cabral, 2008). Conversely over
the same period, the share of exports with low technology input fell. Even so, this
positive development does not necessarily imply that Portugal’s cross over to a
knowledge economy has taken place or that it is successful. Two considerations
impell caution. First, statistics about the technological content in exports cover
manufactured products only. They omit such important exports as services. Whilst
the service sector includes companies commanding a high degree of entrepreneurship
and innovation, especially in Information and Communication Technologies, the part
of this sector in the economy has not, over the past decade, grown markedly. The
share of Information and Communications Technologies in gross fixed capital
formation remained fairly constant over the last 15 years. (Pereira 2010b) Second,
Table 5 shows that the technological content of Portuguese exports appears to have
moved from low-tech to medium-tech products, but not necessarily on to high-tech
goods. Between 2001 and 2008, the share of medium- and medium-low technology in
total exports rose from 13,5% to 23,7% of all manufactured exports. On the same
base, the share of low-tech exports declined from 45% to 34% of all manufactured
exports. (Pereira, 2009). Though the level of technological input apparently increased
since the 1990s, Portugal does not seem, as yet to have crossed over to a high-
productivity, high-value added knowledge economy.
Though the pointers towards the improving technological content of Portuguese
exports are encouraging, data also show that the step up the quality ladder has been
rather towards medium and medium-low technologies, and not the high-tech sectors,
usually associated with a knowledge economy.
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Table 5.
Sector share in total industrial exports.
1990 2000 2006
HIGH TECH 5.56 9.19 14.6
Pharmaceutical products 0.63 1.15 2.28
Clerical equipment and computers 0.64 0.36 3.76
Radio, TV and communications equipment 3.68 6.77 7.87
Medical, optical and precision instruments 0.61 0.81 0.7
MEDIUM-HIGH TECH 21.5 32.12 30.73
Machinery and electrical equipment 4.07 7.17 3.47
Motor vehicles, tows and semi-trailers 7.44 14.43 15.05
Chemical products, except pharmaceuticals 5.61 4.58 6.29
Railroad equipment and transport equip. 0.20 0.38 0.52
Machinery and equipment (non electrical) 4.18 5.56 5.4
MEDIUM-LOW TECH 10.1 12.84 20.41
Construction and naval repair 0.55 0.26 0.24
Rubber and plastic products 1.39 2.79 4.23
Oil refining, petrochemical and nuclear fuels 0.08 0.8 2.58
Non metallic mineral products 4.48 3.66 5.11
Metallurgy 1.26 2.53 4.42
Production of metallic products (machinery and equipment) 2.35 2.8 3.83
LOW TECH 62.44 44.82 34.26
Other manufactures and recycling 2.16 2.15 2.97
Paper pulp, paper, paperboard and printing industry 6.4 5.6 2.51
Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 6.61 6.23 8.21
Textiles, apparel, leather and footwear 40.61 25.94 16.37
Wood and cork and wood products 6.67 4.91 4.2
Cabral (2008)
That said, successful technological adoption goes hand in hand with
improvements in human capital. (Easterlin, 1996; Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar, 2005;
Stoneman,1994) Both export competitiveness and the technological content of its
exports could both be improved if Portugal is able to improve considerably its human
capital. Key to this the evolution over recent decades in certain indicators of human
capital. This, and the role of human capital in constructing a knowledge economy in
Portugal, is pursued below.
The Role of Education for a Knowledge Society
Despite considerable investment in both the quantity and quality dimensions of
human capital that democratic governments have made since 1974, Portugal is still
subject to significant shortcomings in its education when set against other OECD
countries. In part, the persistence of low levels of educational provision in Portugal
can be seen in the legacy of the past. Portugal has lagged on most education
indicators, literacy and enrolment rates, since the 19th century at least. In 1870, for
instance, primary school enrolments in Portugal were around 13,4 percent of the
relevant age cohort, lower by far than the average for other Southern European
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countries (30.4%), below Eastern Europe (16,9%), and considerably behind the
European core (61,8%) (Benavot and Riddle, 1988). Portugal continued to trail
behind other European countries. By 1940, the Nation’s primary school enrolment
had risen to 28.6 percent, still substantially below the European core - 73%, Eastern
Europe - 50.9% -, and even Southern Europe with 54%. (Benavot and Riddle, 1988)
Literacy rates were much lower in Portugal than most other European countries.
(Reis, 2004)
Though indicators of the state of Portuguese education improved, particularly
enrolment and literacy rates, the gap between Portugal and the other Western
European countries moved apart during most of the period from 1926 until 1974,
when Portugal was under the grip of Dictatorship. The regime did not attribute much
value to education as an important source of growth (Amaral 2005). In 1950, around
46% of the Portuguese population aged 15 years and over were unschooled. Only
20% completed primary education. See Table 6 . Some progress was made. By the
late Sixties, universal primary schooling was finally attained (Amaral, 2005), some
decades after the European core. Even so, by the end of the Estado Novo, one third of
all Portuguese were illiterate, one third of those aged 15 or older had full primary
education, 3% had completed secondary education and a residual 0,6% had undergone
university education. (see Amaral 2005)
In sharp and deliberate contrast, democratic governments devoted substantial
public resources, both in absolute terms and in percentage of GDP, to education in an
attempt to catch up with Europe. Between 1974 and 2000, public expenditure on
education rose from 1,8% of GDP, to about 3,7% in 1980, and to 6,9% GDP in 1999.
(Lopes, 2005). This unprecedented effort to improve the country’s human capital was
reflected both in literacy rates and in the average years of schooling. In Table 6,
illiteracy rates – that is, the percentage of population with no schooling - fell from
around 30 percent of the population in 1975 to 8 percent in 2010.
Table 6.
Average years of schooling in Portugal, 1950-2010.
Highest level attained
Primary Secondary Tertiary
total completed Total completed total completed
Year No
Schooling
(% of population aged 15 and over)
Average
years of
schooling
Population
(1000s)
1950 46.1 49.5 20.3 3.4 1.9 0.9 0.4 2.656 5927
1955 42.3 52.5 22.6 4.2 2.2 1 0.5 2.911 6142
1960 38.1 55.9 25.5 4.9 2.4 1.1 0.5 3.207 6276
1965 39 53.3 30.4 6.3 2.9 1.4 0.6 3.471 6387
1970 37.8 53.3 35.7 7.4 3.2 1.4 0.6 3.778 6184
1975 29.7 55.7 40.1 11.9 4.9 2.7 1 4.709 6554
1980 21.9 58.7 44.8 15.9 6.3 3.5 1.3 5.53 7231
1985 16.9 58.8 46.3 18.4 7.4 6 2.2 6.212 7657
1990 13 57.7 47 21.3 8.5 7.9 2.9 6.784 7948
1995 11.8 54.2 45.6 25.5 10.4 8.4 2.9 7.16 8253
2000 10.4 49.7 43 29.8 12.5 10.1 3.4 7.647 8567
2005 12.8 46.2 41 31 13.4 10.1 3.3 7.583 8826
2010 8 43.9 39.9 37.3 16.7 10.8 3.3 8.26 9043
Source: Barro and Lee (2010)
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The average years spent in school steadily rose, almost doubling from 4.7 in
1974 to 8.26 years in 2010. The numbers of those reaching upper secondary and
tertiary education grew substantially since the return of democracy and since 1975,
tripled.
Such an improvement in human capital was an important factor in explaining
Portugal’s growth performance from the mid Seventies onwards. However,
substantial evidence suggests that improvement in the absolute levels of education did
not necessarily translate into a marked closing of the educational gap with other
European and OECD countries. (Banco de Portugal, 2009). First, as the OECD’s
PISA inquiries show, the quality of Portuguese education was low (OECD 2010).
Portuguese students had amongst the lowest PISA scores of all countries in math,
science and reading. (OECD, 2010; 2006; 2003). Second, Portuguese education is not
overly efficient. As a percentage of its GDP, the country spends more than the OECD
average, and gets a lower return from it. (OECD, 2006: Pereira, 2009). Third, the
school dropout rate remains very high, greater that other OECD countries, with the
exception of Mexico and Turkey.
The latest figures from the Barro-Lee international dataset on average years of
schooling bear out the presence of several shortcomings in the formation of human
capital in Portugal. Table 7 shows that on average Portugal has the lowest number
years spent in school at all levels and in the whole of the European Union. Similarly,
Portugal figures has one of the lowest rates in the average years spent in secondary
schooling - better than only Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovenia - and the lowest average
of years spent in university education in the whole European Union.
Table 7.
Average Years of Schooling, all levels, 2010.
All levels Secondary Tertiary
Bulgaria 9.838 2.132 0.528
Czech Rep. 12.137 3.377 0.318
Estonia 11.805 4.982 0.850
Finland 9.987 3.513 0.700
France 10.533 5.234 0.593
Germany 11.825 7.439 0.573
Greece 10.677 3.903 0.924
Holland 11.023 4.512 0.738
Hungary 11.651 3.424 0.578
Ireland 11.646 3.757 0.984
Italy 9.875 4.839 0.336
Poland 9.872 2.084 0.488
Portugal 8.259 2.578 0.282
Romania 10.527 3.426 0.388
Slovakia 11.161 3.028 0.373
Slovenia 8.912 2.452 0.476
Spain 10.382 4.293 0.778
Sweden 11.571 4.959 0.756
United Kingdom 9.752 3.183 0.766
Source: Barro and Lee (2010)
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In effect, the relative gap between Portugal and the most advanced countries in
Europe stayed at the same level over recent decades. In assessing the gap in average
schooling, Figure 11 compares Portugal with five advanced economies of France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK), which constitute the European core. It
plots the relative distance between the average years spent in schooling for the
European core countries with its counterpart in Portugal for all levels of education, for
secondary and tertiary. Since the return of democracy, the differences in average
years of school narrowed significantly. However, despite unprecedented resources
invested in the education sector, the relative gap between Portugal and the European
core over the last two to three decades remained virtually constant.
Thus, considerable expansion and major investment in education were not
enough to reduce the relative gap between Portugal and the European core, at least to
average of years schooling spent in school.
Fig. 11.
Average schooling years in Portugal relative to European core
(European core =100).
a. All levels of education b. Secondary education
c. University education
Source: Calculated from Barro and Lee (2010)
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In face of improvement in the absolute levels of education, Portugal still lags a
considerable education lag vis-à-vis most OECD economies. For these reasons, and
given the technological content of Portuguese exports, we take the view that at this
stage, given the evidence on which we have relied, Portugal has not made the shift
over to a knowledge economy – yet.
Conclusion
Successful though the Portuguese economy has been in moving on from an
agrarian society to an industrial-based economy, it has been less successful in
changing over to a knowledge-based economy. Despite substantial improvement since
the return to democracy, improvements that showed up in several educational
indicators, the relative gap in educational progress between Portugal and the
European core countries is large and over the last few years has remained somewhat
unchanged.
This is somewhat disconcerting and has several implications for policy. First,
since human capital has been the most important source of growth in the Portuguese
economy after 1974, that Portugal has not been able to close the human capital gap
vis-à-vis the European countries we used here as a benchmark could hold future
growth back. Second, Portugal needs to improve the effectiveness of its education
provision, the quality of education, and to explore more assiduously the markets for
education (Amaral, Rosa and Teixeira 2004). Third, improvement to its human capital
and a faster transition to the knowledge economy may turn out to be important factors
for recovering growth in productivity, and, following this, for economic growth to
begin again. Not only do Portuguese data show a strong correlation between growth
in labour productivity and total factor productivity. The slowing down in growth
seems to be strongly associated with a drop in the latter component. Since there are
significant interactions between human capital and gains in productivity, a more rapid
thrust towards the knowledge economy will, in all likelihood, be instrumental for
improving the performance of Portugal’s economy in the near future.
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